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Evolution and Optimality: 
Feathers, Bowling Balls, and the Thesis of Adaptationism 
Ellion Sober 
l .  Does selection optimize! 
Many sciences use the idea of minimization and maximization. 
Ask a physicist about the path taken by a ray oflight as it passes from air into water, and 
you may be cold about Fermat's Law of Least Time (Figure l ) .  If a ray of light goes from 
point A to point B, it will follow the path that minimizes its travel time. Going from A 
co B by way of point 0 takes less time than going from A to B by any ocher route. 
FIGURE 1 
Minimization is maximization by another name; just as light minimizes its travel time 1, 
it maximizes the inverse of its travel time l /t. The light's trajectory can be discovered by 
finding how some quantity is minimized or maximized. One understands nature by 
thinking of nature as going to extremes. This is extremal thinking, but is it optimization? 
Evidently not, because the physicist does not add to this description a concept of better 
or worse. It is neither good nor bad that light acts in this way; nor does light behave as 
it does because this behavior benefits the light, the air, the wacer, or anything else. 
Natural selection resembles light propagation in one respect, but not in another. The 
laws 1 that govern the process of natural selection are the way they are, impervious to the 
costs and benefits they may impose. However, the products of natural selection - the 
traits that evolve because of natural selection - evolve because they are good for the 
individuals that display chose traits. 
Consider an example -an ancestral population of zebras in which all zebras run slow. 
Suppose a mutanc or migrant zebra is introduced into this population who runs fasc. This 
zebra will do better at evading predators chan the others, and so it will have more offspring 
than the average slow zebra. To keep the example simple, let's imagine that zebras 
reproduce uniparentally, and that fast zebras have fast offspring and slow zebras have slow 
offspring. The result is that the trait of running fast will increase in frequency; there will 
be a higher percentage of fast zebras in generation two than there was in generation one. 
If this process is repeated for numerous generations, and fast zebras continue to do better 
than slow zebras in avoiding predators, the trait of running fast will gradually increase in 
frequency and eventually will reach 100% representation in the population. 
Fast replaces Slow in this simple example, but how is the concept of optimization to 
be applied? We consider two phenotypic traits - Fast and Slow - and evaluate each for 
the fitness consequences it has. Running fast is a better trait for a zebra to have than the 
trait of running slow. This description of the fimess consequences of the traits is then 
converted into a prediction: if Fast is fitter than Slow, then the population will evolve to 
a configuration in which everyone is Fast. 
This simple idea is often misrepresented. One hears it said that natural selection 
maximizes the fitnesses of organisms. There is no such guarantee, as we can see by 
comparing Figures 2a and 2b. In ooth these figures, the fitnesses of the two traits are 
represented as a function of che proportion of fast organisms in the population. The two 
figures both express the idea that fast zebras do better on average than slow ones, 
regardless of whether running fast is common or rare. However, the two figures differ 2
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in another respect. In Figure 2a, the cwo lines do nor slope; chlS means that an 1.nd1\'i<lual 's 
chance of surviving and reproducmg depends just on its own running speed and noc on 
the composition of the population in which It lives. In Figure 2b, the rwo lines slope 
downhill; this means that fastt and slow zebras do worse and worse as nmnmg speed 
increases. In Figure 2a the fitnesses are frequency independent; in 2b, they are frequency 
dependenc. 
FIGURE 2 
Which of Figures 2a and lb more accurately represencs che fitness consequences of 
running fast and running slow ? That depends on the biology. It is possible co imagine 
scenarios that would favor each of them. For example, suppose that lions hunt by 
wandering around until they s.ee a herd of zebra and then choose a zebra at random to 
chase. A zebra's chance of getting singled out for pursuit is unaffected by the population's 
composition, and ics chance of geuing caught is seeded by how fast it runs. This would 
justify Figure Za. On the other hand, suppose that fast zebras kick up more dust than slow 
ones, and that lions find herds of zebras by scanning the horizon for dust clouds. Once 
the lions find a herd, they are lazy; they prefer to chase slow zebras over fast ones, even 
though they could catch either type. This scenario favors the representation given in 
Figure 2b; fast zebras always do better than slow ones in the herd, but all the individuals 
in the herd do worse and worse as the average running speed in the herd increases. 
My point in discussing these figures is not to give a realistic picture of how lions hunt 
zebras, bur to make a conceptual point about fitness and selection. The broken lines in 
Figures 2a and lb represent the average fitness of the organisms in the population. This 
average fimess is called w ("w,bar"). Notice that w goes up as the population evolves in 
Figure 2a, but goes down as the population evolves in Figure 2b. Selection improves 
fitness in Figure 2a, but selection reduces fitness in Figure Zb. 
Optimality methods in evolutionary biology do not assume that natural selection 
always conforms to Figure 2a. An optimality model can accommodate the destructive 
effects of selection depicted in Figure Zb just as easily as it can accept the improving 
effects depicted in Figure 2a. The optimality idea is not that selection improves fimess, 
but that the fittest phenotype evolves (Reeve and Sherman 1993). This means, in 
particular, that the fittest of the available phenotypes will evolve; there is no expectation 
on the part of optimality modelers that zebras will evolve machine guns with which to 
repel lion attacks (Krebs and Davies 1981)  or that organisms will evolve the ability to live 
forever and reproduce at an infinite rate (Maynard Smith 1978). 
2. Et1olutionary forces 
Objects released above the surface of the earth accelerate downward at a rate of 3 2 feet/ 
second2• Or rather, they do so unless some force other than the earth's gravitational 
auraction acts on them. A similar principle can be stated for the process of natural 
selection. The process will produce a certain type of change unless other forces 
intervene. 2 
To formulate this idea, we need to begin with a definition: Natural selection occurs 
within a population if and only if there is variation in fitness in the population. Selection 
cannot act on running speed unless zebras run at different speeds. And it isn't enough 
that they run ac different speeds; this variation in phenotype muse make a difference for 
their chances of surviving and reproducing. If all running speeds are equally fit, then 
there is no natural selection with respect to those traits. 
That is our definition, and here is the proposed principle: in a population subject to 3
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natUral selection, fiuer rra.us became more common and less fu mms become more rare, unless 
some force preverus ilus from happening. 3 M ·use of che cerms '"force" and "principle" shou Id 
be taken with a grain of sale. All I mean is char when there is variation in fimcss, one 
expeccs finer traits co replace less fie craics unless something prevents chis from 
happening. 4 If fast zebras are fitter than slow ones, the population will enlarge its 
proportion of fast individuals unless a countervailing force gets in the way. 
Whac might these preventing forces be? There are several (Maynard Smith 1978). 
first, random even cs can prevent ficcer traits from increasing in frequency. If Fast is fitter 
than Slow, this simply means that fast individuals have a higher probability of surviving 
to reproductive age. However, this difference in probabilities does not guarantee char a 
higher proportion of fast individuals will survive. Consider an analogy. Suppose cwo 
coins are both biased cowards heads, bur thac one has a more extreme bias than che ocher. 
Maybe the first coin's probabilicy is 0.9 and the second coin's is 0. 7. If each coin is tossed 
cen times, there is no guarantee that the first coin will land heads more ofcen than the 
second. However, if the coins are each tossed a thousand times, it becomes more certain 
that the first coin will yield a higher frequency of heads. Just as sample size is relevant 
to saying what will happen when coins are tossed, so population size is relevanc co saying 
how cercain it is that fitter traits will outperform less fit traits. Small populations open 
che door for chance effects. 
Another "force., that can prevent fitter phenotypes from evolving is the underlying 
genetics - the pattern by which phenotypes are coded by genotypes. In my simple 
example about the zebras, I assumed that zebras reproduce uniparentally and that 
offspring always perfectly resemble their parents. With sexual reproduccion, complica, 
tions can arise. Consider the phenomenon of heterozygote superiority. Suppose there 
are three running speeds - Slow, Medium, and Fas'C - where the fittest of these three is 
coded by a heterozygote. If fast individuals have the Aa genotype, medium individuals 
have AA, and slow individuals have aa, then selection will not lead the population to 
evolve to the configuration of 100% Fast. What will evolve is a balanced polymorphism 
in which all three running speeds continue to be represented in the population. There 
are other genetic arrangements, more complicated than that ofheterozygote superiority, 
that lead to the same result. le is possible for genetics to "get in the way" - to prevent che 
ficcest phenotype from evolving. 
A third factor that can prevent the optimal phenotype from evolving is time. If a 
population begins with a range of phenotypes, it will take time for natural selection to 
transform this population into one in which the optimal phenotype has gone to fucacion. 
If biologists start scudying this population before sufficienc time has elapsed, they will 
discover that the population is polymorphic. Here again, ic is a concingent matter 
whether the best phenotype among the range of variants has acrained l 00% representa, 
ti on. 
The list of possible prevencers could be continued (cf. e.g., Reeve and Sherman 1993), 
but I chink the pattern is already clear. When seleccion is che only force guiding a 
population's evolution, the fittest phenotype evolves. However, when other forces 
intrude, other outcomes are possible. Selection can produce optimality, but it also can 
fail to achieve this result. 
"Pure" natural selection has predictable results, but the world is never pure. Popu, 
lations are never infinitely large, which means that random drift always plays some role, 
however small. Still, the question remains of how closely nature approximates the pure 
case. I t  is an empirical matter whether natural selection was the only important influence 
on the evolution of a particular trait in a particular population, or if nonselective forces 4
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also played an imponant role. The Newtonian analogy connnues to apply. The eanh's 
gravitational force induces a component acceleration on objects released alt its surface. 
However, since the eanh is noc surrounded by a vacuum, falling objects always 
encouncer air re5istance. le is therefore an empirical matter whether the trajectory of a 
falling body is guided preeminendy by gravity or if other forces play an importanc role. 
We know chat objeccs are noc the same in this respect; che crajeccory of a feather differs 
markedly from the trajectory of a bowling ball. In physics, we are quite accustomed to 
dus pluraliscic view of che relative importance of different forces; as we now will see, this 
is a useful analogy for thinking about optimality issues in evolutionary biology. 
3. From ontolog, co epistemolog:y 
So far, I have described the process of natural selection and said what ics effects are likely 
to be. When it acts alone, one result will obtain; when selection aces simulcaneously with 
nonselective forces, other results are possible. These assenions describe the forward­
directed properties of the laws of evolution - given an array of forces, what will be the 
result? 
Lee us now ask a backward.s-directe.d question. If we observe a trait in a population, 
what array of evolutionary forces should we postulate to explain it? If we see that zebras 
run fast, should we infer that natural selection was the only important cause of the trait's 
evolution, that it was one of the important causes, that it played a minor role, or that it 
played no role at all? We now have shifted from ontology to epistemology. The ontology 
of the theory of natural selection describes the results that different constellations of 
forces will have. Our present epistemological question concerns how we are to know 
what the forces were, given that we observe the population's present configuration. How 
are we to infer past from present - the causes from their observed effects? 
We now have located the conceptual arena within which evolutionary biologists 
continue to debate the thesis of "adaptationism." Not surprisingly, this ism word means 
different things to different people. Some regard the so-called debate about adaptationism 
as a pseudo-problemi they feel that che serious issues are beyond scientific dis1Pute. I want 
to describe a quite different view of this controversy that Steven Orzack and I have 
developed collaboratively (Onaclc and Sober 1994; Sober 1993), and which Reeve and 
Sherman (199 3) also defend. We feel that there is a serious scientific question here 
whose answer is not yet in hand. We think that less is actually known about che truth 
of adaptationism than critics and def enders often suggest. Agnostics often get attacked 
from both sides; both theists and atheists dislike being told that no one knows what they 
claim to know. 
In order to isolate the substantive scientific issue chat still remains unsettled, I'll now 
describe several remarks one commonly hears - from biologists, philosophers, cognitive 
scientists, and others - on both sides of this controversy. 
4. Six Sayings about Adapuuionism 
Sa)ling Number l :  "Natural Select.ion is the only natural process rhat. can produce adaptive 
complexity." 
In his essay "Universal Darwinism," Richard Dawkins (1986) updates the classic 
philosophical design argument for the existence of God. If one examines the vertebrate 
eye, for example , and wants to explain its complexity, its organization, and why its parts 
conspire so artfully to allow the organism to see, the only naturalistic explanation one 
can thinlc of is natural selection. Rather than conclude that adaptive complexity points 
to the existence of an intelligent designer, Dawkins argues that it points to the existence 5
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of a "'blind watchmaker" - i.e., co che process of natural selection. which is noc only blind. 
but mindless. 
Richard Lewonrin ( 1 990) has pointed ouc thac there are complex and orderly 
phenomena in nature that do noc demand explanat ion in terms of natural selection. The 
rurbulent flow of a wacerfall is mathematically complex, but it is not the resulr of a 
selection process. The lattice structure of a crystal is highly ordered, but this is not the 
resulc of natural �election. 
Dawkins might reply that waterfalls and crysta�s have not evolved; they are not the 
result of descent with modification. In addition, the complexity of waterfalls and the 
orderliness of crystals confer no advantage on the waterfalls or rhe crystals themselves. 
Dawkins' design argument could be formulated as the thesis that when evolution leads 
a trait to be found in all the organisms in a population, and that trait is complex, orderly, 
and benefits che organisms possessing ic, the only plausible explanation of the trait's 
ubiquity is natural selection. 
This argument leaves open a serious issue that Lewonctn•s response suggests. Is it 
possible to be more precise about the concepts of"complexity., and "order., in such a way 
that the special fe atures of traits that require selective explanation are made dear? I do 
not have an answer co this question, but in the present context I think we may set it to 
one side. In my opinion, we should grant that natural selection provides a plausible 
explanation of the vertebrate eye, and that no alternative explanation is now available. 
Adapcationism does not have to claim that none will ever be conceivable. Even though 
warerfalls and crystals attained their complexiry and their orderliness by nonselective 
means, it is entirely unclear how nonselective processes could explain the structure of 
rhe vertebrate eye. 
Dawkins takes this point to establish the correctness of adaptationism. However, the 
arch 11anci-adaptacioniscs" Gould and Lewontin ( 1978). in their influential paper "The 
Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm - A  Critique of the Adaptationisr 
Programme," assert that "Darwin regarded selection as the most important of evolution­
ary mechanisms (as do we}." What, then, is all the shooting about, if both sides agree 
that natural selection is important, indeed indispensable, as an explanatory principle? 
Dawkins' argument provides a good reason to think that natural selection is an 
important part of the explanation of why the vertebrate eye evolved. However, this does 
nor cell us whether the traits exhibited by the eye are optimal. Perhaps when we 
anatomize the organ into traits, we will discover that some of its features are optimal 
whereas others are not. As noted before, selection can be part of the explanation of a 
trait's evolution without that trait's being the best of the phenotypes available. The issue 
of adaptationism concerns not just the pervasiven.e·ss of natural selection, but its power. 
Saying Number 2: "Adaptationi.sm i5 incompatible with the e.xi5tence of traiu that initially 
evolve for one adaptive reason but then evolve co take over a new 
adaptive function." 
One of the main points of the spandrels paper is that it is important not to confuse the 
current utility of a trait with the reasons that the trait evolved in the first place. Natural 
history is filled with examples of opportunistic switching; traits that evolve because they 
perform one function are often appropriated to perform another. Sea turtles use their 
forelimbs co dig nests in the sand, but these forelimbs evolved long before turtles came 
out of the sea co build nests (Lewontin 1978). Insect wings evidently began co evolve 
because they facilitated thermal regulation and only later helped organisms to fly 
(Kingsolver and Koehl 1985); for further discussion, see Reeve and Sherman ( 1993). 6
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If adaptacionism embodied a commtCmenr to the view that chere is lmle or no 
opportunisnc switching in narnre, the pervasiveness of this paccem would undermine 
adaptauonism. However, mosc self,proclaUTied adapcacioniscs have no trouble �ich chis 
idea. To be sure, some adaptauorusts have made the mistake of assummg that the 
current utilicy of a tra1c is the reason chat the trait uutially evolved. But this appears to 
be a mistalce on the part of adapcanorusts. nm a thesis chat is imrins1c co che idea of 
adaptationism. le is useful to separace che proposmon of adapcauonism from che people 
who happen to espouse 1c (Sober 1993). 
The idea of opportunistic switching places natural selection in the driver's sear. 
Selection governs the initial evolution of che trait and selection governs its subsequent 
modification. The poinr is that the functional requirements that determine which 
variants are fittest change in the course of the trait's evolution. If adapcacionism is a 
thesis about the power of natural selection, the existence of opportunistic switching is 
not central to the dispute. 
Saying Number 3: u Adaptationi.sm is incompatible wich che eriscmce and imponance of 
constraints chm limit the fX>wer of ruu ral selection." 
The word "constraint" has been used in many differenc ways; biologists talk about 
mechanical consrraints, developmental constraints, phylogenetic constraints, genetic 
constraints, etc.,, etc. Underlying this diversity, however, there is the idea thac 
constraints limit the abilicy of natural selection to produce certain outcomes. To the 
degree that adaptation ism emphasizes the power of natural selection, it apparently must 
minimize the importance of constraints {Reeve and Sherman 1993). As we will now see, 
this is correct for some so-called constraints, but not for others. 
I described the role of "genetic conscrairtts" in Section 2. The manner in which 
genotypes code phenotypes can prevent the fittest phenotype from evolving. If this 
pattern of coding is fixed during the duration of the selection process and does not itself 
evolve, then it is properly called a constraint on natural selection. Adaptationism as a 
research program is committed co the relative unimportance of such conscrairtcs. The 
assumption is that a simplifying assumption about heredity - that like phenotype 
produces like phenotype - is usually close enough to the truth; the details of the 
underlying genetics would not materially alter one�s predictions about which phenotypes 
will evolve. 
I now want to consider two examples of a constraint of a different sort. Maynard 
Smith ( 1978) points out, in his discussion of running speed, that an animal's running 
speed increases as its leg bones get longer, but that lengthening the leg bone makes it 
more vulnerable to breaking. This means that running speed is not optimized on its own, 
but tthat selection is constrained by the effect that running speed has on vulnerability to 
injury. The optimality modeler responds to this consideration by thinkirtg about which 
bone shape is best, given the competing requirements of speed and strength. The 
existence of constraints does not refute the optimality approach, but gives it shape. 
The second example I want to consider is the work on "antagonistic pleiotropy" of 
Rose and Charlesworth ( 1981). They found that female Drosophila have high fecundity 
early in life and low fecundity late, or have low fecundity early and high fecundity late. 
Females do not have high fecundity both early and late. For the sake of an example, 
imagine that this fmding is due to the fact that all females have the same number of eggs. 
They vary in how they apportion these eggs to different stages of the life cycle. The fixed 
number of eggs thus serves as a constraint on the distribution of reproductive effort. 
Once again, the biologist need not take this result to show that an optimality model is 7
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inappropriate. Rather, the question will be formulated ro cake accounr of the constraint: 
given that all females have the same number of eggs. what i.s the optimal distribution of 
eggs to differenc phases of che life cycle? If rwo distribution patterns are represented in 
che population, the optimahtv modeler "ill want to explore the possibility that this is a 
polymorphism created by natural selection. 
The example described by Rose and Charlesworich might be termed a developmental 
constraint. The reason is ch.ac if a fruirfly lays lots of eggs early in life, this has 
consequences for what she will be able to do lacer. The example from Maynard Smith 
is less happily subsumed under this label, since leg length and leg strength are established 
simultaneously, not sequentially. Perhaps it should be called a "mechanical'  constraint 
instead. 
Notice that in both these examples, a naive analysis of the problem might suggest that 
chere are four possible combinations of traits, whereas the real icy of the sicuation is thac 
chere are jusc two. For example, we might naively suppose thac zebras can have long leg 
bones or short ones, and that, as a quite separate maner, they can have strong leg bones 
or weak ones: 
Leg strength 
strong weak 
long w x 
Leg len,gth 
short y z 
The entries in chis 2-by-2 cable represent che fitnesses of che four combinacion:s of traits; 
w is the highest value and z the lowest. If selection operated on aEI four of these variants, 
che optimal outcome would be the evolution oflegs that are long-and-strong. However, 
given the correlation of leg length and leg strength, there are just two variants, whose 
fitnesses are x and y. What will evolve is either long�and�weak or shorr-and-strong, 
depending on which trade-off is better. 
In this type of example, talk of constraints is really a way co describe the variation that 
natural selection has to act upon (Reeve and Sherman 1993). The question is not 
whe11:her the fittest of the available phenotypes will evolve, but what the available 
phenotypes in fact are. If  adaptationism is limited to a claim about the power of natural 
selection co ensure that the fiittest of the available phenotypes will evolve, then the 
existence of constraints of this type is irrelevant. 5 
In the spandrels paper, Gould and Lewontin emphasize the importance of the 
concept of evolutionary spin-off; a trait can evolve !because it is correlated with another 
trait thac is selected, rather than being directly selected itself.6 The chin is apparently 
such a trait, and the architectural idea of a spandrel was used as an emblematic metaphor 
for this general category. Chins do not evolve independently of jaw structure; it is a 
misconception to think that chins evolved because they conferred some adaptive 
advantage. However, if jaw structure evolved under the guidance of natural selection, 
and chins evolved as spin,off from selection on jaw structure, then ic may still be true that 
natural selection has caused the best available phenotype to evolve. The overarching 
category of correlation of characters subsumes mechanical constraints, developmental 
constraints, and evolutionary spin-off. 
Let us now consider the idea of "phylogenetic constraint." When selection causes a 
crait co evolve, the trait evolves against a background of other traits that are already 
present in the population. Gould's ( 1980) example of the panda's "thumb" illustrates 
.a.. :� � ..... :�•· '"r ,.. .... rocf"r->l .... ., ... �'.:le: f"A PvAlvP rlPvirP� for �rrinninl? hamboo. these devices had 
8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 26 [1996], No. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol26/iss1/2
48 El1ou Sober 
to be modifications of traits chac were already presenc. The spur of bone in che panda' 
wruc was a variant thac Ylas able to arac agamsc dus ancestral hackground biology: the 
panda was nor going co evolve from scracch an cffic1enc unplemenc for smppmg bamboo. 
Sunilar remarks apply co the skeletal structure chac allows human beings to have upnght 
gait. Phylogeny "consrrams" subsequent evoluuon m the sense chac 1c prondes the 
background of traits, whose modif1caaons consmuce che novelnes chac nacural selecuon 
gets co act upon (Reeve and Sherman 1993). 
I hope ic is dear that the recognition of phylogenettc constraints is noc ac all 
inconsistent with the claim that the optimal available phenotype evolves. Naive 
adapcationists may forget about the imponance of background biology; however, 
sophisticated adaptationists are still adaptationists. 
In summary, if adaptationism assens that natural selection ensures thac the finest 
available phenotype evolves, its relation to the concept of "'constraint" is less chan 
straightforward. The view is in conflict with genetic constraints being important and 
pervasive, bui: it does noc conflict with the existence and imponance of mechanical, 
developmental, or phylogenetic constraints. 
Saying Numbe-r 4: 11Adapuuionism is untestable; it involves the uncritical formulation of 
. . 
" 1ust-so scones. 
It is possible to formulate an adaptacionisc thesis abouc all phenorypic craics, about mosc 
of them, or about some particular phenorype found in a particular population. Lee us scare 
with the last of these. 
The traic I wane co consider is sex racio - the mix of males and females found in a 
populacion. R.A. Fisher ( 1930) analyzed sex ratio by formulating a quantitative 
optimality problem: what mix of sons and daughcers should a parenc produce, if the goal 
is to maximize the number of grandchildren? Fisher showed that with certain assump, 
tions about the populacion, the sex ratio strategy thac will evolve is one in which parents 
invest equally in sons and daughters. 7 Given that human males have a slightly higher 
mortality rate than females, Fisher's model predicts that slightly more males than females 
will be conceived, that slighcly more males than females will be born, and that the sex 
ratio among children will become even at the age when their parents stop taking care of 
them. 
This adaptationist model is an instructive example with which to evaluate the charge 
that adaptationism is untestable. Fisher's explanation of sex ratio in human beings is 
testable. The obvious thing to check is whether its quantitative predictions about sex 
ratio are correct. ln addition, Fisher's model rests on certain assumptions (e.g., chat there 
is random mating), which also can be cested. 
A further property of sex ratio theory is worth noting. Hamilton ( 1967) discovered 
that Fisher's argument is a special case of a more general pattern. I f  there is random 
mating, equal investment is the strategy that will evolve. But if there is inbreeding, a 
female,biased sex ratio will evolve. We can apply this body of theory to numerous species 
that exhibit different sex ratios, in each case checking whether the patterns of parental 
investment, mating system, and sex ratio are as the theory predicts. From the point of 
view of testing an optimality model, the sex ratio found in a single species is, so to speak, 
a single data point. To properly test a theory, several data points are needed. It is for this 
reason that a comparative perspective on testing adaptationist hypotheses is extremely 
important. 
One often hears it said that adaptationist explanations are too "easy" to invent. l f  one 
fails, it is easy to invent another. This is sometimes true, but it: is not always so. What 9
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other explanacion can we construct for the slightly male-biased sex ratio in human beings 
at conception that slowly changes to an even sex ratio later on! And how easy is it to 
invent a new and unified explanauon of the pattern of variarion in sex ratio char is found 
across different species? I'm not saying that no alternative explanation could exist. just 
that it is not so easy to invent one. The truth of the macrer is th2t some adaptationist 
explanations are difficu.l.t. to test. le is a double exaggeration to say char all adaptacionist 
explanacions are impossible to cesc. 
The charge of untestability is often formulated by saying that if one adaptationisc 
hypothesis turns out co be wrong, another can be invented to take its place. This 
comment does not assert that specific adaptive explanations are untestable; in fact, the 
complaint suggests that specific models can turn out to be wrong, which is why the need 
for new models arises. Rather, the cricicism is leveled, not at a specific adaptationist 
explanation, but at an adaptationist claim that is more abstract. The claim 1thac chere 
exiscs an adaptive explanation of a specific trait is hard co prove wrong; such existence 
claims are harder to refute than specific concrete proposals. 
It is important to recognize that the difficulty posed by existence claims is not limited 
to adapcationism. For example, consider the on-going debate about whether the human 
language faculty is an adaptation to facilitate communication.8 An alternative proposal 
thac has been discussed is that the abilities that permit language use evolved for a quite 
different reason and only subsequently were co-opted to facilitate communication. This 
is an existence clatim ; it says that a spin-off explanation exists, but does not provide the 
details of whac the explanation is supposed to be. This type of conjecture is just as hard 
to cest as existence claims that say that a trait was directly selected for some reason we­
know-noc-whac. 
Popper's ( 1959) falsifiability criterion entails that such exiscence claims are not just 
difficult to refute, but impossible to refute, and therefore are not scientific statements at 
all. Shall we therefore conclude that adaptationis.m and anci-adaptationism are both 
unscientific - a pox on boch their houses? Not at all - existence claims are cescable, 
though chey are not falsifiable in Popper's overly restrictive sense. If an adaptationisc 
model about a specific crait is confirmed by data, then che anti,adaptationist existence 
claim about that trait is disconfinned. And symmetrically, if an anti,adaptationisc model 
about a specific craic is confirmed, then the adaptationist existence claim about that era it 
is disconfirmed. This is the pathway by which the existence claims advanced both by 
adaptationism and by anci-adaptationism as well can be tested. They do not inhabit a 
no-man's land beyond scientific scrutiny (Reeve and Sherman 1993). 
Adaptationist just-so stories are sometimes easy to make up. 
The same is true of anti-adaptationist just-so stories. Adaptationism as a general 
thesis about all or most phenotypic traits is difficult to test. The same is true of pluralism, 
which views selection as one of several important causes of trait evolution. Specific 
adaptacionist proposals are sometimes weakly supported by flimsy evidence, but the same 
can be said of some specific anti-adaptationist proposals. If adaptationism is a thesis 
about what has happened in nature, one cannot reject that thesis because biologists have 
noc always tested the thesis with perfect rigor. 
Saying Number 5: "Populations of organisms are always finite, always experience mutation, 
and frequently experience migration and assortative macing. 
Optimality nwdels fail co represent chese nonseleccive factors and 
therefore are false. "  
It is true that optimality models ignore nonselective factors that foequently or always play 10
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a role in influencing trait evolution. However, the debate about adaptauomsm does nor 
concern the exLStenee of such faccors, but their anponance. An opnmahty model predicts 
that a trait will evolve to a certain frequency. A perfeccly reahsnc model, which 
accurately describes both selective and nonselecuve forces, also makes a prediction 
about what will happen. Adaptationism asserts that these predictions will be the same 
or nearly the same. 
Because adaptationism is a relatively monistic position, an adaptacionisc model will 
always fie the daca less well than a pluralistic model. This is because an opcimaliry model 
can be regarded as nested wichin a pluralistic model. Roughly speaking, they are related 
in the way the following rwo equations are related: 
H I :  y = ax 
H2: y = bx + cw + dz. 
In these hypotheses, y is the dependenc variable, x, w, and z are independent variables, 
and a, b, c, and d are adjustable parameters whose values must be estimated from the data. 
Because H l is nested within HZ, HZ will always fit the available data better than H l .9 
Hypothesis choice in science is not guided exclusively by a concern for fitting the data. 
Scientists do not always prefer che more complex HZ over the simpler H 1 .  Simplicity also 
plays a role in model selection, although the rationale for the weight given simplicity is 
not complecely underscood.10 Typically, scientists will see how well the simpler model 
H I  fits the data; only if goodness-0f,fic significantly improves by moving co H2 will H 1 be 
rejected. A pluralistic model will always fit the data better than a relatively monistic 
model that is nested within irt, but how much of an improvement pluralism provides 
depends on the data. 
Sa-,mg Number 6: "Adapuuioni.st chinking is an indispensable research tool. The on[:y wa-, 
to find out whether an organism is irnperf eccly adapted is to describe 
what it would be like if it were perfectly adapted." 
I think this Last saying is exactly right. Optimality models are important even if they tum 
out to be false (Reeve and Sherman 1993; Sober 1993; Orzack and Sober 1994). To find 
out whether natural selection has controlled the evolution of a particular phenotypic 
trait, one must discover whether the fittest available trait has evolved. To do this, one 
must have some grasp of what the fittest trait actually was. What is the optimal trade, 
off of leg strength and leg length? What is the optimal sex ratio in a randomly mating 
population? These questions are important to adaptationists and to anti,adaptationists 
alike.1 1  
5. Concluding Commerus 
The most important point I can make about the ongoing controversy over adaptationism 
is that adaptationism as a method of doing biology is distinct from adaptationism as a 
claim about nature. Methodology and ontology need to be separated. Perhaps 
adaptationists have often ignored questions about constraints and have confused the 
issue of current utility with the question of historical origin. The spandrels paper is aimed 
at correcting these mistakes. These negative remarks are quite consistent with the idea 
that thinking about optimality is a useful - indeed, an indispensable - heuristic for 
formulating hypotheses that are worthy of test. 
It is a quite separate matter what role natural selection has played in the history oflife. 11
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pluralisric chan some other b1ologiscs are mclmed to be. Although they claim that natural 
selecuon is the most important cause of trait evolution, thcv maintain that other caus�s 
have been unportanc as well. A more monisric viewpoint would be that narural selection 
is noc just important - ic is the only important factor; ocher, nonseleccive, processes ma · 
safely be lgnored. This raises a substantive quesnon about the history of life that must 
be decided on a trait by trait basis. For example, it is perfec d ' possible chat genetics has 
goccen in the way of the evolution of some traits {e.g., because of herero:ygoce 
superiority) but noc others. And perhaps there has been sufficient ttmc for opumal 
phenotypes to evolve in some contexts, but not in others. And random evencs may have 
been an imporranc influence in some populations, but not in ochers. These issues are nor 
settled by affirming the imponance of natural selection in explaining the vertebrate eye; 
nor are they settled by pointing out how ofren adaptationist thinking has been sloppy. 
Just as feathers and bowling balls differ with respect ro the forces chat imporranrly 
influence how they fall when released above the earth's surface, so different traits in 
different populations may differ with respect co which evolutionary forces significancly 
influenced their evolution. Even after all reasonable methodological caveats are given 
their due, adaptationism as a claim about nature remains a conjecrnre with which ro 
reck,on. 
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Notes 
• My thanks to Andre Ariew, Paul Bloom, Alain Boyer, and StcYcn Or:ac'k for useful 
comments on earlier drafts. I also am graceful to Hudson Reeve and Paul Shem1an for 
calling my attent ion co che derailed agreemenr chat: links Reeve and Shem1an ( 1993) and 
che ideas summarized here, which are presented in Sober ( 1993) and Or::ack and Sober 
(1994) in more detail. 
1 le is controversial whecher there really are laws thac govern evolucionat)· processes. 
Bearry ( 1995) has recently argued that there is no such thing. I d  isagree. and hope co spell 
out my reasons on another occasion. 
2 This description of evolutionary theory as a "theory of forces" is drawn from Sober 
( 1984). 
1 More precisely, a trait increases in frequency precisely when its fimess (\V) is grcacer 
than w. If p is che frequency of a trait in generation i, and p' is its frequency in generation 
i+ 1 ,  then the "replicator dynamics" I am describing says thac p' = pW/w. 
� Selection can produce evoluc!ion only if the traits under selection are heritable. It makes 
no sense to talk of selection "alone" producing an evolutionary ouccome if this means thac 
it does so without heredity. Rather, the right way to understand the principle I describe 
in the text is char selection can be expected to lead co the evolution of fitter traits when 
like phenotype produces like phenotype. Depanures from chis simple rule ofherediry can 
impede the abiliry of natural selection to lead fitter phenotypes to evolve, as explained 
below. 
5 On the other hand, it must be admitted that some self,described adaptacionists often 
hold that the range of variation available for selection to ace upon is quite rich; for 
example, see Dawkins ( 1982, p. 32). This thesis about variation sometimes surfaces in 
debates abouc adaptationism in a manner that may be illustrated by an example suggested 
to me by Paul Bloom. Consider rwo hypotheses about how the human language faculty 
evolved: 
(A) An ancestral human population contained a vast number of 
language structures; natural selection eliminated all 
but one of these. Thus, the present language faculty is 
the fittest of the alternatives that were available. 
(B) Due to constraints on the physical form of human beings and their 
ancestors, there were just two phenotypes represented in the ancestral 
population: no language faculty at all and the language faculty that 
human beings now possess. The latter was fitter than the former in the 
evolution of our species, and natural selection insured char this fitter 
phenotype was the one that evolved. 
14
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Under boch hypotheses, nacuraJ selecr1on caused the fmesc available phenotype co 
evolve. However, natural selection seems to be "domg more work" m (A) than u doe 
m (8). Adaptatiorusts such as Pinker and Bloom ( l  990) tend ro favor hypotheses thac 
resemble (A), whereas anu-adapcauoniscs such as Chomsky ( 1988) ad\'ance claims chat 
resemble (B). 
Does the difference becween (A) and (B) represent a disagreemenc abouc che "power" of 
natural selectton! Consider the following cype of question: 
Why does this population now have phenorype P rather chan 
a 
phenotype P ? c 
Here P IS the population's actual presenc phenorvne and P is a conceivable phenocype chat 
0 ' 1 t" c 
the population now does not possess. Selection will be the answer co more of these 
questions if (A) is true than it will if (B) is true. And constraints on variation will be the 
answer to more of these questions if (B) is true than it will if (A) is true (on the assumption 
chat there are finitely many conceivable variants). However, neither of these judgments 
allows one to compare the power that selection and constraints accual.ly exercised. I see 
no way to answer the following question: 
l( (A) is true, which was the more important cause of 
the phenotype that evolved - selection or constraints? 
and che same holds for the parallel question about (B). 
Consider the following two stage process: 
conceivable variation accual variation varianc that evolves 
--- > 
Selection is the process that is responsible for what happens in the second stage of this 
process. Constraints on variation, on the other hand, determine which of the conceiv­
able variants actually are represented in the ancestral population. Presumablym is a large 
number; there are many variants that one can conceive of that are not actually 
represented in ancestral populations. If so, selection effects a reduction from n variants 
to a single trait, whereas constraints explain why only n of the n +m conceivable variants 
are actually represented. However, it would be a mistake to compare the "power" of 
selection and of constraints by comparing the magnitudes of these two reductions. le is 
impossible to be very precise about how large m is; and a little imagination will make m 
so big that constraints always tum out to be more "important" than selection. This is a 
hollow victory for anti,adaptationism, since it turns on no empirical fact. See Wright, 
Levine, and Sober ( 1992, pp. 14 7 - 1 5 1) for further discussion of "limits and selections." 
6 In Sober ( 1984) , I discuss the difference becween selection,of and selection,for in this 
connection. 
15
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; For a simple exposition of this idea, see Sober ( 1 993, p. 17) .  
s Pinker and Bloom ( 1990) and the accompanying commentaries on their target article 
provide an indication of current division of opinion on this issue.  
Q The rwo models will fit the data equally well in a case of zero d imensionalit)• - when the 
best estimate of values for the parameters c and d is chat c = d  =0. Note also that li2 is 
a pluralistic model in which the independent variables combine additively. This is noc 
che mathematical form that pluralistic models of evolution will take. 
'° Forster and Sober ( 1994) argue that H. Akaike's approach to the problem of model 
selection helps explain why simplicity matters in scientific inference. 
11 In this paper I have not discussed the way in which it.he units of selection problem affects 
how adaptationism should be formulated. The optimal phenotype for an organism need 
not be the optimal phenotype for a group of organisms. This point was already visible in 
Figure 2b; in this example, running fast is good for the organism but bad for the group. 
Although it is more or less a matter of defmition that the fittest phenotype evolves under 
pure natural selection, it is a substantive question in cases like the one depicted in Figure 
2b what that fittest phenotype will be. For an inttoduction to the units of selection 
problem, see Sober (1993); for discussion of how the units of selection problem connects 
with the issue of adaptationism, see Sober and Wilson (forthcoming) . 
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